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Uber is a regulatory entrepreneur: a company that seeks to change the 
law in its favor.  In the United States, Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship
changed the American taxi industry and the laws that regulate it.  But the 
company’s venture into France presented unique challenges.  This Comment 
examines Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship in France and analyzes the 
factors that hindered Uber’s quest to revolutionize the French taxi industry. 
It discusses the tension between Uber and the French government and the 
policies behind both sides’ goals. It also seeks a compromise between Uber
and the French regulators: one that acknowledges the issues with both 
Uber’s aggressive business model and France’s heavy government regulations.
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Without it, this publication would not have been possible.  I would also like to thank 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”) is a ride sharing company that connects
drivers with passengers through its mobile phone application.1  Passengers 
can select their current location and destination, and request that a nearby 
driver take them to their chosen destination.2  The company is “essentially 
running a taxi dispatch service for the smartphone age.”3 
Yet Uber’s business model is at odds with the highly-regulated taxi
industry.  Taxis are licensed vehicles driven by professional drivers and 
are extensively regulated by governments.4  Cities issue taxi medallions
or permits that allow a taxi to operate.5  The number of permits is regulated,
 1. UBER, https://www.uber.com (last visited Sept. 2, 2017) [http://perma.cc/W6ES­
P4HN].
2. Ride, UBER, https://www.uber.com/ride (last visited Sept. 2, 2017) [https://perma.cc/ 
2B7E-EN9M]. 
3. Jordan M. Barry & Elizabeth Pollman, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L.
REV. 383, 385 (2017). 
4. See Rebecca Elliott, Sharing App or Regulation Hack(ney)?: Defining Uber 
Technologies, Inc., 41 IOWA J. CORP. L. 727, 732 (2016). 
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and a few medallion owners will then lease their medallions to drivers.6 
Taxi drivers will often rent taxis from the medallion owners, and may have 
to pay as much as $1.32 million if they want to buy a medallion7 and own
their right to operate a taxi.8 
Uber’s requirements are less strict.  The company only requires that
drivers meet their insurance requirements and go through a background 
check.9  Uber drivers can use their own car, so long as it meets the vehicle 
requirements.10  This simple means of signing up, without going through
the process of leasing a taxi and medallion, is an advantage Uber has over
taxis. Uber’s number of drivers is not fixed by the company, but rather 
driven by the free market, allowing Uber drivers more opportunity and freedom
than taxi drivers.11  This difference between regulation and non-regulation
creates tension between the taxi industry and Uber, as Uber essentially runs
a taxi service without having to submit to the vast regulations with which
traditional taxis must comply.12 
Uber revolutionized the way that people view taxi cab services and personal
transportation.13  It brought cab services into the sharing economy, where 
services such as personal transportation and housing are shared among
consumers.14  Uber focuses on affordability and convenience, two staples
of the sharing economy.15  In most cities, it is cheaper to take an Uber than 
6. Id.
 7. Simon Van Zuylen-Wood, The Struggles of New York City’s Taxi King, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/features/2015-taxi-medallion-king [https://perma.cc/
7DPD-FMMG]; see also Aamar Madhani, Once a Sure bet, Taxi Medallions Becoming 
Unsellable, USA TODAY (May 18, 2015, 9:29 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
news/2015/05/17/taxi-medallion-values-decline-uber-rideshare/27314735 [https://perma.cc/
9YNV-C4GL].
8.  Van Zuylen-Wood, supra note 7.
 9. Uber Driver Requirements, Alvia, http://www.alvia.com/uber-driver-requirements 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/NUA8-TY6J]. 
10. Id. 
11. Snead, supra note 5.
 12. See Elliott, supra note 4. 
13. See Dan Gillmor, The Uber Revolution is Just Beginning, and No Cabbie Protest 
Can Stop It, THE GUARDIAN (June 13, 2014, 1:22 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2014/jun/13/uber-cabbie-protest-sharing-economy [https://perma.cc/QB8T-YJ7U].
14. See Alamea D. Bitran, Comment, The Uber Innovations That Lyfted Our Standards
Out of Thin Air[Bnb], Because Now, “There’s an App for That”, 8 ELON L. REV. 503, 505
(2016).
15. Id. at 513. 
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it is to take a traditional taxi.16  It is also faster to take an Uber than it is to 
take a taxi,17 and the software is free and easy to download on any
smartphone.18  The idea of a stranger picking up a passenger may seem 
dangerous, but Uber is now thought to be safer than traditional taxis.19 
The impact of ridesharing is apparent in many different aspects of today’s 
economy, as even the trucking industry could be threatened by the ride 
sharing Uber created.20 
Since its founding in 2009, Uber has seen exponential growth despite 
battling regulators throughout every step of its expansion.21  Uber has an 
estimated worth of $68 billion, which is more than General Motors,22 and 
Uber has not even made an Initial Public Offering.23  As of 2015, 160,000
people drove for Uber in the United States, and in one month Uber added 
40,000 new drivers.24  This growth is fueled by Uber’s 15.8 million monthly
active users in the United States,25 as well as its operations in more than
16. These rates depend on a number of factors. See, e.g., Sara Silverstein, These 
Animated Charts Tell You Everything About Uber Prices in 21 Cities, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Oct. 16, 2014, 12:47 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-vs-taxi-pricing-by-city­
2014-10 [https://perma.cc/TMS3-3DK6].
17. See Ellen Huet, Uber, Lyft Cars Arrive Much Faster Than Taxis, Study Says, 
FORBES (Sept. 8, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/09/08/
uber-lyft-cars-arrive-faster-than-taxis/#70a615955f73 [https://perma.cc/KY2P-EALM].
18. Get, UBER, https://get.uber.com (last visited Sept. 6, 2017) [https://perma.cc/ 
QXK8-9FJJ].
19. See James Cook, Despite the Scary Rape Headlines, Uber is Probably Still the 
Safest Way to Order a Taxi, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 8, 2014, 7:24 AM), http://www.
businessinsider.com/despite-its-problems-uber-is-still-the-safest-way-to-order-a-taxi-2014-12
[https://perma.cc/7EY3-UJNS]. 
20. See Sarwant Singh, The Disruption Uber Has Brought to the Taxi Business Is 
Coming to Trucking, FORBES (Aug. 3, 2015, 5:47 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
sarwantsingh/2015/08/03/uber-taxi-truck/#26c3379e41b0 [https://perma.cc/73AQ-PE92].
21. For purposes of this Comment, a regulator is a government agency, legislative 
body, commission, or any other government group whose job is oversight or passing laws 
that regulate an industry.
22. See Liyan Chen, At $68 Billion Valuation, Uber Will Be Bigger Than GM, Ford, 
And Honda, FORBES (Dec. 4, 2015, 11:23 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/liyanchen/2015/
12/04/at-68-billion-valuation-uber-will-be-bigger-than-gm-ford-and-honda/#1ca4e7585858 
[https://perma.cc/CZ64-EJMM]. 
23. See Christopher Mims, Why Uber Might Stalk an IPO Sooner Rather Than 
Later, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2016, 2:11 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-uber­
might-stalk-an-ipo-sooner-rather-than-later-1470593467.
24. Though Uber does not release updated data for its drivers, these figures are likely
much higher now. See, e.g., Douglas MacMillan, Uber Touts Its Employment Opportunities, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2015, 6:51 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-touts-its­
employment-opportunities-1422229862 [https://perma.cc/8AHE-34B3]. 
25. See Mike Sonders, These Latest Uber Statistics Show How It’s Dominating Lyft, 
SURVEYMONKEY INTELLIGENCE (Aug. 26, 2016), https://web.archive.org/web/20160926183610/ 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/business/intelligence/uber-statistics [perma.cc/L857-FQ5H].
130
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60 countries and almost 300 cities across the globe.26  By all measurements,
Uber is a powerhouse in the start-up world.27 
Uber’s explosive expansion does not come without its fair share of 
controversy. Since its inception, Uber has fought United States regulators 
on insurance,28 employee benefits,29 taxi licensing,30 and many other issues.31 
Entrenched incumbents like taxi medallion owners protest Uber because
the company’s ride share success is dependent on deregulating the taxi
industry and upsetting the status quo that kept medallion prices high.32 
Yet, Uber supporters have gone to great lengths to support Uber in its 
regulation battles,33 showing just how polarizing the company’s business 
model is.
Uber’s legal issues are different from those of a typical company. Uber
is a regulatory entrepreneur, as it “makes changing the law a material part
 26. See Phillip Levinson, 3 Reasons Why Uber Will Win in the End, BUS. INSIDER
(Oct. 16, 2015, 3:55 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/why-uber-will-win-in-the-end­
2015-10 [http://perma.cc/E49H-XC7Z]. 
27. See Nathan McAlone, Here’s How Uber Got its Start and Grew to Become the 
Most Powerful Startup in the World, BUS. INSIDER TECH. (Sept. 13, 2015, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/history-of-uber-and-its-rise-to-become-the-most-valuable­
startup-in-the-world-2015-9 [http://perma.cc/9PWY-Y2TQ].
28. See Christina Farr, Who’s Responsible for Your Uber Driver’s Health Coverage?, 
NPR (Oct. 11, 2015, 6:24 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015/10/11/ 
447157698/who-s-responsible-for-your-uber-driver-s-health-coverage [https://perma.cc/
P9WD-MYN9].
29. See Kia Kokalitcheva, Uber’s Employment Fight Just Got More Complicated, 
FORTUNE (Mar. 4, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/03/04/uber-driver-unemployment [http://
perma.cc/TQ68-85R7]. 
30. See Ryan Lawler, A Day After Cutting a Deal with Lyft, California Regulator
Reaches an Agreement with Uber as Well, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 31, 2013), https://tech
crunch.com/2013/01/31/a-day-after-cutting-a-deal-with-lyft-california-regulator-reaches­
an-agreement-with-uber-as-well [https://perma.cc/D54Q-H8SX]. 
31. See Harrison Weber, As Uber Battles 13 Lawsuits, Cabbies & State Agencies 
Are Out for Blood, VENTUREBEAT (May 8, 2014, 8:54 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2014/
05/08/as-uber-battles-13-lawsuits-cabbies-state-agencies-are-out-for-blood [https://perma.cc/
6ADM-ATBQ].
32. See Josh Barro, Under Pressure from Uber, Taxi Medallion Prices Are Plummeting, 
N.Y. TIMES: The Upshot (Nov. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/28/upshot/
under-pressure-from-uber-taxi-medallion-prices-are-plummeting.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
V6QL-45HJ].
33. See Rosalind S. Helderman, Uber pressures regulators by mobilizing riders and 
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of its business plan.”34  Uber’s business does not conform to the regulatory 
standards set forth for other taxi services, and its ridesharing service has 
been battling the status quo ever since the company first entered the market. 
Uber intentionally takes advantage of legal gray areas, disregards cease­
and-desist letters, and actively tries to lobby for deregulation by mobilizing
its customers and taking part in traditional political processes.35  Its
regulatory entrepreneurship is necessary for its growth and survival. 
Uber’s expansion into France posed a new set of challenges, as both 
government regulators and traditional taxi drivers sought to stifle the 
company’s growth.36  The French government fined Uber drivers37 and 
arrested both the Uber France CEO and the Uber Europe General Manager.38 
Taxi drivers and their supporters burned tires and attacked Uber drivers in
protest.39  Overall, compared to the United States, the legal challenges in 
France were tougher for Uber to overcome,40 and the protests were more
violent.41  Yet, Uber is far from giving up its fight to operate its business 
in France,42 and the battle over ride sharing in the country is not yet over.43 
This Comment will focus on Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship in 
France and the possible solutions to the battle between Uber and the 
French government.  First, this Comment will define and explain regulatory
entrepreneurship, using Uber’s business model as an example to illustrate the
34.  Barry & Pollman, supra note 3, at 385. 
35. Id. at 386–87.
 36. See Liz Alderman, Uber’s French Resistance, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2015) http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/ubers-french-resistance.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/ 
L7QA-6YBQ].
37. See Laure Fourquet & Mark Scott, Uber Drivers Face Fines in Paris, N.Y.
TIMES: BITS (Feb. 22, 2015, 11:30 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/02/22/uber­
drivers-face-fines-in-paris/?_r=0 [perma.cc/HB2H-4636].
38. See Romain Dillet, Uber France Leaders Arrested for Running Illegal Taxi 
Company, TECHCRUNCH (June 29, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/06/29/uber-france­
leaders-arrested-for-running-illegal-taxi-company/ [perma.cc/Y5LB-Y5A9]. 
39. See Angelique Chrisafis, France Hit by Day of Protest as Security Forces Fire
Teargas at Taxi Strike, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 26, 2016, 1:14 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2016/jan/26/french-taxi-drivers-block-paris-roads-in-uber-protest [perma.cc/5FKZ-8NAV].
40. Compare Alderman, supra note 36, with Johana Bhuiyan, It’s Already Over and
Uber has Won, BUZZFEED (Feb. 20, 2015, 5:32 AM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/johana
bhuiyan/its-already-over-and-uber-has-won?utm_term=.hs8mkddXvW#.tck8exxR12 [perma.cc/
N7LM-E7WZ].
41. Compare Chrisafis, supra note 39, with Maya Rhodan, Taxi Drivers Protest
Uber and Lyft, Stop DC Traffic, TIME (Oct. 8, 2014), http://time.com/3482420/taxis-uber­
lyft-washington-dc [perma.cc/Z9A6-42JS].
42. France is not the only country in Europe that Uber is currently fighting. Italy,
Germany, and Spain have also attempted to ban or have successfully banned Uber. See Elliot,
supra note 4.
 43. See Alexander Demasi, Uber: Europe’s Backseat Driver for the Sharing Economy, 
7 CREIGHTON INT’L & COMP. L.J. 73 (2016). 
132
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term.  Second, this Comment will analyze Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship
in the United States.  This analysis will include Uber’s strategies, regulators’
responses, and the factors that allowed Uber to succeed in the United States.  
Third, this Comment will analyze Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship in France 
by drawing distinctions between the company’s regulatory entrepreneurship in
the United States.  Once again, Uber’s strategies and regulators’ responses 
will be examined, and the factors that led to the different outcome in
France will be identified and analyzed. 
Finally, this Comment will propose a solution to the battle between Uber 
and French regulators in the hopes that both regulators and regulatory 
entrepreneurs can learn from Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship in France.
Regulators in France and Uber can compromise on taxi regulations to 
ensure that Uber can continue to operate while still complying with insurance
and consumer safety laws.  A full ban on Uber is unnecessary and will deter 
other regulatory entrepreneurs from entering France’s market, which means 
the jobs created by these companies will not be available for French workers. 
Furthermore, as regulatory entrepreneurship becomes more common for 
companies, governments should compromise in order to obtain efficient 
solutions. As other United States regulatory entrepreneurs expand overseas, 
they will meet similar challenges and Uber’s experience may be instructive 
in resolving these issues. 
II. WHAT IS REGULATORY ENTREPRENEURSHIP? 
Regulatory Entrepreneurship is a term advanced by Professors Jordan 
M. Barry44 and Elizabeth Pollman.45  The following is an analysis of this
concept, which is critical to understanding this Comment’s theoretical 
basis. 
Regulatory Entrepreneurs’ success depends on “the resolution of legal
issues concerning a core aspect of their business.”46  Examples of legal
issues include uncertainty in the current law’s application, the application 
of new regulations, and the existence of current restrictions that hinder a 
companies’ business.47  Companies have always lobbied to ensure the law 
stays favorable to their business, but regulatory entrepreneurship is different 
in that companies enter a market with legal uncertainty and attempt to 
44.  Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. 
45.  Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. 
46.  Barry & Pollman, supra note 3, at 384–85. 
47. Id. at 392. 
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conform the law to their business from the outset;48 hence, the “entrepreneurship” 
in regulatory entrepreneurship.
Uber is “the country’s most famous regulatory entrepreneur,” but it is 
not the only one.49  Lyft, Airbnb, Tesla, FanDuel, DrafKings, and FedEx
are all examples of regulatory entrepreneurs.50  Lyft is Uber’s competitor
in the rideshare industry and has the same business model as Uber.51 
Airbnb challenges the hotel industry’s regulations by connecting individuals 
that rent their personal homes and apartments to customers in the same
way that a hotel rents a room to its guest.52  Airbnb had to beat short-term
rental regulations in jurisdictions where it operates in order to successfully
run its business.53  Tesla, an electric car manufacturer, could not get car 
dealers to sell a product contrary to their gasoline powered cars.54  In order
to get around regulations that limited car sales to car dealers, Telsa had to 
sell its cars directly to customers through its own store.55  FanDuel and 
DraftKings both operate fantasy sports sites that are contrary to gambling
laws.56 Perhaps surprising, even FedEx is a regulatory entrepreneur.57  FedEx 
competed with heavy cargo regulations and eventually succeeded in deregulating
the industry.58  These examples help to illustrate exactly what regulatory 
entrepreneurs are. 
A. Methods of Regulatory Entrepreneurship 
Regulatory entrepreneurs use four main tactics to change the law,
though these are not exhaustive.  First, they may break the law or take 
advantage of legal gray areas.59  The idea behind this strategy is that “it is 
48. Id.
 49. Id. at 385. 
50. See generally id.
51. LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2017) [perma.cc/SRX8-6H5K]. 
52. See generally Emily Badger, How Airbnb Just Changed the Housing Laws in 




54. Cliff Weathers, How Tesla and New Car Technologies Could Make Auto Dealers 
Obsolete, SALON (Oct. 11 2014, 9:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/10/11/how_tesla_ 
and_new_car_technologies_could_make_auto_dealers_obsolete_partner [perma.cc/2TCD-3R2L].
55. Id. 
56. Walt Bogdanich et al., Attorney General Tells DraftKings and FanDuel to Stop 
Taking Entries in New York, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
11/11/sports/football/draftkings-fanduel-new-york-attorney-general-tells-fantasy-sites-to-stop- 
taking-bets-in-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/MDP6-QF85].
57.  Barry & Pollman, supra note 3, at 423. 
58. See generally Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx 
Story, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1495 (2005). 
59.  Barry & Pollman, supra note 3, at 398. 
134
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better to enter markets and start providing services to the public, legally 
or otherwise, than to seek approval from regulators.”60  Companies may
“take an aggressively favorable reading of the relevant law”61 or even 
completely ignore cease-and-desist letters.62 
Second, companies attempt to grow too big for the government to ban.63 
This growth serves two purposes: it improves the company’s valuation 
and increases its political strength by increasing its number of customers.64 
Companies will often value growth over profits to increase their customer
base.65  A company’s popularity places pressure on regulators, especially 
elected officials, because the popular support makes regulators reluctant 
to upset their voters.66 
Third, regulatory entrepreneurs motivate their users to lobby on their 
behalf.67  This is easier in the digital age, where companies can send emails
to their customers asking them to advocate for the company.68  Companies
ask their customers to sign petitions, contact government officials, and
even canvas door-to-door.69  Since many regulatory entrepreneurs’ businesses
center around smartphone applications, this mobilization can be done quickly 
and effectively.70 
Finally, regulatory entrepreneurs also use traditional political lobbying 
techniques.71 Regulatory entrepreneurs hire political operatives as board 
members or executives in order to prepare for political battles.72  In addition,
companies also hire professional lobbyists to help win battles with state 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. E.g., id. at 399. 
63. Id. at 400. 
64. Id. at 401. 
65. See id. at 401–02. 
66. See id. at 403. 
67. Id.
 68. Helderman, supra note 33. 
69. See id. See also Barry & Pollman, supra note 3, at 405. 
70. See Conor Dougherty & Mike Isaac, Airbnb and Uber Mobilize Vast User Base
to Sway Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/
technology/airbnb-and-uber-mobilize-vast-user-base-to-sway-policy.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
7SCG-WE6R]. 
71.  Barry & Pollman, supra note 3, at 406. 
72. For instance, Uber hired David Plouffe, a former advisor to President Obama. 
See, e.g., Emily Badger & Zachary A. Goldfarb, Uber hired David Plouffe when it realized
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legislatures.73 These techniques are distinguishable from those employed
by non-regulatory entrepreneurs because regulatory entrepreneurs enter
the market with plans to change the law and take these measures from the
outset of their business.74 
B. Factors That Influence Regulatory Entrepreneurs’

 Success or Failure 

Various business and legal factors affect whether regulatory entrepreneurs 
succeed.75  The business factors mentioned include scalability, connectedness, 
and mass appeal.76 
Scalability involves whether the business is able to quickly and easily
expand its user base.77  Businesses like Uber that use software-based platforms 
are scalable because they can efficiently provide the same service to 1 or 
1,000 consumers.78  Regulators move slowly, and are unable to stop a 
regulatory entrepreneur before its consumer base is too large to regulate 
without backlash.79  To take advantage of this, regulatory entrepreneurs
use guerilla growth tactics; by not including customized service or capital
investment, the company is able to grow quickly.80  This enables the company 
to obtain sufficient support to battles regulators.81 
Connectedness refers to the company’s ability to interact with its consumers
and mobilize them to act on its behalf.82  Smartphone app based platforms 
make this easy because these companies can quickly send emails or in­
app notifications to their consumers to keep them informed on the company’s
business.83  Users must also feel connected to the company before they 
will advocate on the company’s behalf, and companies that obtain user
information can adequately connect with these individuals by analyzing 
that information.84 
73.  Barry & Pollman, supra note 3, at 406. 
74. Id. at 407. 
75. Id. at 410. 
76. Id. at 411. 
77. Id.
 78. See id. at 416. 
79. Id. at 411.
 80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id.
 83. Id. at 416. 
84. See Zack Guzman, Uber Mines Rider Data to Fight NYC Political Brawl, 
CNBC: TECH (June 30, 2015, 2:32 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/30/uber-using­
rider-data-to-help-in-political-fight.html [https://perma.cc/NPZ2-AUFL]. 
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Mass appeal means creating a business that everyone wants to consume.85 
Uber and Airbnb post about the political issues that affect their respective 
drivers and hosts.86  This allows the companies to gain sympathy and 
favorable public opinion while they work behind the scenes to change 
laws.87  A company’s ability to sell its product to all social and economic 
classes helps the company build a consumer base that wields significant
political power across a variety of states and countries.88 
The legal factors, referenced above, that affect regulatory entrepreneurs’
success include penalties imposed on violators and the government
structure of the jurisdiction where the regulation is taking place.89  Some
penalties are relatively harmless, such as fines or citations.90  A company 
may pay these penalties as they occur rather than trying to change the law.91 
Such penalties are on the low end of the spectrum when it comes to 
deterring regulatory entrepreneurs.92 
The government structure is a complex factor, and depends on (1) whether
the regulation is determined at a local, state, or national level, and (2) whether
the public office administering the regulation is susceptible to public opinion.93 
The level of government that enforces the regulation can influence regulatory 
entrepreneurship in a variety of ways.94  Local laws can generally be changed
quicker than laws at the state or national level.95  For regulatory entrepreneurs, 
this is extremely important, as their escalating growth can be affected by
85.  Barry & Pollman, supra note 3, at 417. 
86. See Darrell Etherington, Uber to Create $3M Legal Defense Fund for Drivers 
Affected by “Wrong and Unjust” Ban, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 29, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/ 
2017/01/29/uber-to-create-3m-legal-defense-fund-for-drivers-affected-by-wrong-and-unjust­
ban [https://perma.cc/8TSP-RNPN]; Elizabeth Dwoskin, How a Former Clinton Aide is 




87.  Barry & Pollman, supra note 3, at 415. 
88. Id. at 412. 
89. Id. at 417–18. 
90. Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber Fined $7.6 Million in California for Failure to Report
Driver Data, VERGE (Jan. 14, 2016, 5:06 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2016/1/14/ 
10772412/uber-fine-california-utility-driver-data [http://perma.cc/EM94-JJHJ].
91.  Barry & Pollman, supra note 3, at 417–18.
 92. See id. at 423. 
93. Id. at 410. 
94. Id. at 418. 
95. Id.
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an ability to quickly change the law.96 State laws are the next easiest to 
change, and laws that fall on either the local or state level are generally
easier for regulatory entrepreneurs to bend to their purposes because they
use up less company resources to influence.97  The many state and local 
jurisdictions also allow regulatory entrepreneurs to isolate their battles to
favorable locations and increase their chances of success.98  Furthermore, 
many state judges are elected, which allows companies like those mentioned to
influence those campaigns to ignite favorable changes in the courts.99 
This is not to say that regulatory entrepreneurs cannot win at the federal 
level: VCR manufacturers and FedEx have shown that change is possible 
even at the highest level of government.100  However, the federal government
has more resources to resist regulatory entrepreneurs. 
An additional factor that does not quite fall into either the business or 
legal factors is the fact that startup companies make up the largest number
of regulatory entrepreneurs.101  Startups are naturally innovative and their 
contributions to the tech and business world often make them regulatory
entrepreneurs by default.102 Startups typically use guerilla growth tactics
to quickly expand their user base.103  Regulatory entrepreneurship is fraught 
with risk, but venture capitalists and angel investors are willing to take 
high risks to support startup companies.104  Some companies, like Airbnb, 
do not even make a profit, so the investors’ support is necessary to the success 
of the companies.105 
These above factors demonstrate that no single strategy will ensure a 
regulatory entrepreneur’s success.  Regulatory entrepreneurship is a complex
line of business that has many moving parts and requires companies to 
have effective business and legal plans in order to succeed.
 96. Id. at 417–18. 
97. Id. at 418–19. 
98. Id. at 419–20. 
99. See generally David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
265 (2008).
100. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); see 
generally Fisch, supra note 58. 
101. Uber, Lyft, Airbnb, and Tesla were all startups. See Barry & Pollman, supra note 3, 
at 424–30. 
102. Id. at 424. 
103. Id. 
104. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 
VAND. L. REV. 1405 (2008).
105. See Rolfe Winkler & Douglas MacMillan, The Secret Math of Airbnb’s $24 
Billion Valuation, WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2015, 3:15 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the­
secret-math-of-airbnbs-24-billion-valuation-1434568517 [https://perma.cc/7U8G-LCG6]. 
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C. Regulatory Entrepreneurship’s Future
As Barry and Pollman point out, predicting the future is “a difficult 
prospect at best,” but trends in regulatory entrepreneurship allow educated
guesses about where the industry will go and which factors will influence 
its success.106  There are additional factors in the business and legal world 
that will help regulatory entrepreneurship grow. 
Technology is the basis for many regulatory entrepreneurs’ businesses, 
and as technology exponentially increases, so does the opportunity for 
regulatory entrepreneurship.107  This coupled with laws allowing new investment
will help to boost regulatory entrepreneurship in the coming years.108 
Regulatory entrepreneurship is now commonplace, and investors are 
comfortable investing in regulatory entrepreneurs.109 
From a political standpoint, regulatory entrepreneurs have a slight advantage
given the current political atmosphere.  The political gridlock that currently
keeps Congress stagnate will also affect regulatory entrepreneurship by 
slowing federal regulators’ ability to inhibit entrepreneurs, thus shifting
regulatory pressure to local and state governments where regulatory
entrepreneurs have the most success.110 
Yet, regulatory entrepreneurs also face challenges.  Occupational licensing 
—government permission to operate a business or profession—and incumbent
industries threatened by regulatory entrepreneurship will often push regulators 
to maintain these licensing requirements.111  This type of regulation has
increased dramatically over the past sixty years, and resulted in negative 
effects on unemployment and product costs.112 
Restrictive zoning, where the government places limits on the activities 
that occur in certain areas, is another challenge.  For example, commercial
activity cannot occur in certain residential areas, which conflict with
Airbnb’s business plan of allowing homeowners to rent out their rooms.113 
106.  Barry & Pollman, supra note 3, at 430. 
107. Id. at 433–34. 
108. See Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules 
to Permit Crowdfunding (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015­
249.html. 
109.  Barry & Pollman, supra note 3, at 430–31. 
110. Id. at 430. 
111. Id. at 438. 
112. Id.
 113. See Rachel Swan, Airbnb’s New Dinner Sharing Venture “Completely Illegal”
(Update), S.F. WEEKLY (June 4, 2014, 2:53 PM), http://archives.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/ 
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In turn, Airbnb has fought restrictive zoning as part of their regulatory 
entrepreneurship.114 
These factors are by no means all-inclusive or individually material to 
a regulatory entrepreneur’s success, but they provide examples of what
will influence regulatory entrepreneurship’s success or failure.  Success 
will depend on the company’s business model and a combination of these 
factors. Furthermore, it is important to note that regulatory entrepreneurs 
seek to make a profit, and do not necessarily want to make society perfect.115 
Instead, they want to shape society according to their interests in succeeding 
as a business.116  Popular support for a company does not mean that the change
they are enacting is good for society as a whole.117  For example, Tesla
has permission to operate its car dealerships in a number of states, but in 
at least one of them, the law effectively applies only to Tesla.118 This shows 
that regulatory entrepreneurs’ success in changing the law will not necessarily
mean effectively changing the law for everyone.119  Accordingly, these concerns
do not always favor giving regulatory entrepreneurs vast amounts of political
power.120 
A proper analysis of these factors requires looking at all of the circumstances,
some of which do not yield a clear right or wrong answer.  However, they
are helpful in advising a solution to regulatory entrepreneurs’ battles with
regulators. 
Now that the theory of regulatory entrepreneurship has been explained, 
this Comment will turn to Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship specifically. 
The rest of this Comment will focus on how Uber fought regulators in the 
United States and France, deriving from these examples the factors that
made the difference in Uber’s push to change the law.  This Comment will
then propose a solution to Uber’s current legal battles in France.  With
more American regulatory entrepreneurs expanding into foreign countries, 
and foreign regulators fighting changes in the status quo, a study of Uber’s 
2014/06/04/airbnbs-new-dinner-sharing-venture-completely-illegal-update [http://perma.cc/
J5V2-V2C4].
114. Will Coldwell, Airbnb’s Legal Troubles: What Are The Issues?, THE GUARDIAN
(July 8, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/travel/2014/jul/08/airbnb-legal-troubles-what­
are-the-issues [https://perma.cc/A6TR-LMUK]. 
Future Rivals are Screwed, GEEKWIRE (Feb. 18, 2014, 4:05 PM), http://www.geekwire. 
115. 
116. 
 Barry & Pollman, supra note 3, at 443. 
Id.
 117. Id. 
118. Todd Bishop, Tesla Wins Battle Against Auto Dealers in Washington State, but 
com/2014/tesla-wins-battle-auto-dealers-washington-state-future-rivals-screwed [http://perma.cc/
2AB6-Z7RC]. 
119.  Barry & Pollman, supra note 3, at 445–46. 
120. Id. at 446–47. 
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challenges in France will be helpful to both regulatory entrepreneurs and 
regulators who will face similar challenges in the future. 




Uber started when Travis Kalanick and Garrett Camp decided to challenge
San Francisco’s taxi problem in 2009.121  Taxis were inefficient and customers
were often stranded while waiting to be picked up.122  Kalanick and Camp
created Uber to challenge the entrenched taxi industry, and this motivation 
shows that even from the beginning, Uber was meant to be a regulatory
entrepreneur.  Uber has been extremely successful in the United States, and 
setting these goals from inception likely influenced its success.
In analyzing Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship in the United States,
this section will examine Uber’s strategy for changing the law, and regulators’ 
responses to that strategy. The factors that influenced Uber’s success will 
be examined and used for a comparison with Uber’s expansion into
France, which is examined in Part IV of this Comment. 
A. Uber’s Strategy for Changing the Law 
Uber set out with the goal of providing an alternative to the taxi industry, 
an industry with heavy regulations.123  To overcome this challenge, Uber
needed to face not only the taxi companies and taxi drivers themselves,
but also the regulatory system that supported each.  Concerns over insurance,
accidents, driver and vehicle quality, and costs have largely driven these 
heavy regulations.124  Uber needed to address these issues and show that 
they could be managed by a company even without extensive government
regulation.
Uber used strategies in line with the theory of regulatory entrepreneurship 
while expanding its business in the United States.  The company ignored
cease-and-desist letters, grew too big to ban, mobilized its users to take 
action on its behalf, and lobbied legislators through traditional political 
means.
 121. Uber’s Founding, UBER, https://newsroom.uber.com/ubers-founding (last visited Aug.
3, 2017) [https://perma.cc/UU4Z-857Y].
visited Aug. 3, 2017) [http://perma.cc/6TKZ-X4RU].
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. WHO’S DRIVING YOU?, http://www.whosdrivingyou.org/history-repeating-itself (last 
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Uber is known for receiving and ignoring cease-and-desist demands 
from regulators attempting to halt its business.125  In fact, there are several
cities where Uber has ignored such demands.126  Where regulations are lax or
Uber will not suffer a penalty for continuing to operate, the incentive to 
stop services is low, especially when Uber’s plan is for its customer growth 
to outpace regulators. 
Uber set its sights on growing too big to ban.127  The goal was to grow
big enough that there would be too high a political price for regulators to
stop the company.128  To achieve this growth, Uber started drastically 
reducing prices, to the point where it was actually losing money on the
average ride.129 While there are debates over the sustainability of this strategy, 
it brought in customers who wanted affordable rides and the new demand
allowed Uber to expand its business to cities all across the world.130  Uber’s
response when met with regulators’ threats of shutdown in San Francisco:
keep expanding.131  The more that people invest in the company as riders
and drivers, the more pressure that regulators feel not to attempt to shut
down the business.132  No government entity wants to be responsible for costing 
people jobs.
This strategy came at a cost, as Uber has reportedly operated with massive
losses.133  However, the company is worth $63 billion, so despite the losses, 
investors still support the business model.134  The customers that Uber adds
to its base are more valuable to the company than a profit margin.
Uber’s riders have shown their worth each time Uber mobilized them
to put pressure on regulators.  While fighting an insurance bill in New 
York City, Uber gave free rides to and from city hall so that supporters
could protest the bill.135  Uber encouraged riders to contact city hall and 
125. Marcus Wholsen, Uber’s Brilliant Strategy to Make Itself Too Big to Ban, WIRED
(July 8, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/07/ubers-brilliant-strategy-to-make- 
itself-too-big-to-ban [https://perma.cc/4J9Y-3GTZ]. 
126. See, e.g., Molly Smith, Cease-and-Desist Order Not Keeping Uber, Lyft Drivers Off
the Streets, WREG (July 14, 2014, 2:34 PM), http://wreg.com/2014/07/13/cease-and­
desist-order-not-keeping-uber-lyft-drivers-off-the-streets [https://perma.cc/A4G9-SBCK].
INSIDER (June 29, 2015, 9:04 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-reportedly­
127. 
128. 






 133. See Biz Carson, Uber is Reportedly Losing Boatloads of Money, BUSINESS 
operating-at-a-470-million-loss-2015-6 [https://perma.cc/33YU-FDL7].
134. See Chen, supra note 22. 
135. Giulia Olsen, Uber Protests Loudly Outside City Hall, N.Y. OBSERVER (Nov.
18, 2015, 4:50 PM), http://observer.com/2015/06/uber-protests-loudly-outside-city-hall 
[https://perma.cc/2CNK-U2JK].
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express their opinions, generating 17,000–20,000 emails.136  Uber also
mobilized its users to sign petitions on its behalf.137  Uber’s messages often 
specifically detail which politicians to contact with a description of the 
bill or law at issue.138  When users open the app in areas where a law is at 
issue, Uber will automatically show them this information and ask for 
responses.139  The app makes it hard for users to avoid getting at least minimal 
details about the issues, establishes a personal connection between Uber 
and its users, and increases the chance that a user will participate in the action 
Uber seeks.140 
Traditional lobbying techniques are still part of Uber’s arsenal. Uber
has hired at least 161 lobbyists in over 50 cities and states in the United 
States,141 and in the first quarter of 2016, Uber increased its congressional
lobbying spending by 191% over the first quarter of the previous year.142 
The city of Portland, Oregon even fined Uber for violating lobbying rules 
in its attempt to lobby politicians.143 
Similar to other regulatory entrepreneurs, Uber has employed political 
operatives.  Uber added David Plouffe, a former advisor to President Obama,
as a board member and senior advisor.144 Plouffe ran President Obama’s
2008 campaign, and Uber essentially brought him on board to run a political
campaign for Uber.145  Adding Plouffe to the board shows just how political
Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship has become.
 136. Chris Smith, Battlin’ Bill de Blasio’s Uber Fight, N.Y. MAG. (July 22, 2015, 
10:38 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/07/battlin-bill-de-blasios-uber-fight.html 
[https://perma.cc/HMB5-SUTC]. 
137. Josh Dawsey, Uber Targets Mayor de Blasio on Proposed Curbs on Growth, 
WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2015, 9:22 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-targets-mayo­
bill-de-blasio-on-proposed-curbs-on-growth-1437096154. 
138. Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber is Using its App to Troll Local Politicians Again, 
THE VERGE (Mar. 10, 2016, 12:26 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/10/11193852/
uber-florida-senate-andrew-gardiner-politician-app-troll [https://perma.cc/KUB5-JXMQ].





Helderman, supra note 33. 
David McCabe, Uber Ramps Up Lobbying Spending at Start of 2016, THE HILL
spending-rises-at-start-of-2016 [https://perma.cc/2S3K-8A5T]. 
143. Brad Schmidt, Uber Fined $2,000 for Violating Portland Lobbying Rules, OREGON 
LIVE (Jan. 5, 2016, 11:20 AM), http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2016/01/ 
uber_fined_2000_for_violating.html [https://perma.cc/MJ9Z-KUC5]. 
144.  Dougherty & Isaac, supra note 69. 
145. Nancy Scola, The Obamization of Uber, POLITICO (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.
politico.com/magazine/story/2015/02/obama-uber-115166 [https://perma.cc/8U4V-589Y].
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Uber’s tactics combine both innovative techniques—using the mobile
app to mobilize users—and traditional techniques—lobbying governments— 
to carry out change. The benefit of being a regulatory entrepreneur with an
app-based business is that there are avenues of strategy not available to
companies that do not rely on technology.  The success of these strategies often
depends on one another as well.  For example, without a large user base,
mobilization of these users would be more difficult for Uber to accomplish. 
B. Regulators’ Responses 
Though Uber has been successful in the United States, its strategies have
been met with resistance.  Government regulators and the taxi lobby fought
tooth and nail to stop Uber from operating on turf usually reserved for 
traditional taxis.  The slow nature of regulators meant that Uber had a lot 
of time to operate and grow its business before any real crackdown began.
The penalties imposed in the United States were also not severe enough
to deter Uber’s services, though Uber compromised on some of its practices. 
As mentioned briefly above, many of these fights were over legislation 
meant to regulate Uber.  When Uber entered these markets, ridesharing
did not fit within the existing regulatory scheme, so Uber had room to wiggle 
around regulations that applied to taxis.  As regulators slowly caught up,
the fight focused on methods for regulating Uber.146 
Most of these battles went Uber’s way and many of Uber’s business 
policies were adopted as law. “Each government, whether municipal or
state, goes through its own process to craft rules, but in the end, officials 
generally codify the insurance coverage, background-check policies, and
inspection protocols Uber already has in place.”147  Once Uber won the 
popular support of the voters and taxpayers, there was little keeping it from 
winning the legislative battles as well.148  Josh Alpert, director of strategic
initiatives for Portland’s mayor, said of Uber’s hold on Portland’s city
council, “They kind of run this.  I feel like they will just wear you down. If
we end up in court, we will have to lose just based on resources.”149 
Uber’s battles are not just with regulators.  Taxi drivers themselves have 
taken up the fight against Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship. Just as
Uber mobilized its users to lobby the government, taxi cab companies 
mobilized their drivers to protest laws favorable to Uber.150  The threat of 
146. Cf. Hawkins, supra note 90. 




 149. Id. 
150. Rhodan, supra note 41. 
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the taxi companies was legitimate given the industry’s strong lobbying 
presence in many cities.  For example, the New York taxi industry made
massive contributions to Bill de Blasio’s New York City mayoral campaign.151 
These contributions led to accusations that the taxis owned de Blasio,152 
and fueled Uber’s attacks on de Blasio’s regulation plans.153  But  taxi  
industry support was not enough to stop Uber from getting its way with
regulations.154  Despite these attempts to regulate Uber, the company flourished 
in the United States.
C. Factors That Influenced Uber’s Success in the United States
Due to the complexity of Uber’s business and its relationship with 
regulators, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly which factors led to Uber’s
success in the United States.  However, it is possible to isolate some of
the favorable circumstances which gave Uber an advantage. 
Many of Uber’s toughest battles were at the local or state level, as opposed 
to battles with the federal government. This can be critical for successful
regulatory entrepreneurship, as the federal government is much harder to 
avoid and has more resources to regulate companies.  Taxi regulations 
usually come from cities as opposed to states, which gives Uber an advantage 
by allowing the company to use its resources on smaller markets in order 
to force change. Uber’s victories in cities like Memphis, San Francisco,
and New York City show just how important battles at the smaller levels 
of government can be to regulatory entrepreneurship’s success. 
Regulators imposed penalties against Uber for noncompliance, but most 
of these were small fines that Uber paid for its drivers.  For example, in 
2016 Uber agreed to pay up to $25 million in fines to settle a lawsuit filed
 151. Michael Grynbaum, Taxi Industry Opens Wallet for de Blasio, a Chief Ally, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/18/nyregion/de-blasio­
reaps-big-donations-from-taxi-industry-he-aided.html?_r=0.
152. Yoav Gonen, Taxi Industry Gave de Blasio Over $550,000 for Campaign, N.Y.
POST (May 17, 2014, 12:10 PM), http://nypost.com/2014/05/17/taxi-industry-gave-de­
blasio-over-550000-for-campaign [https://perma.cc/9QSG-ECUP]. 
153. Fitz Tepper, Uber Launch “De Blasio’s Uber” Feature in NYC with 25-minute 
Wait Times, TECHCRUNCH (July 16, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/07/16/uber-launches- 
de-blasios-uber-feature-in-nyc-with-25-minute-wait-times [https://perma.cc/NB48-QWU7].
154. Issie Lapowsky, Uber Wins its Battle Against NYC’s Mayor-for Now, WIRED
(July 22, 2015, 5:25 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/07/uber-wins-battle-nyc-mayor­
now [https://perma.cc/4QW3-6ZPM]. 
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by San Francisco and Los Angeles.155  Uber made these penalties part of 
its business expenses, and the company continued to operate despite the 
fines. 
Uber’s mass appeal also helped its success.  Uber’s platform is convenient: 
a smartphone app that a user can download for free.  It also provides a 
cheaper alternative to taxis, enticing customers who want to switch from 
taxis to Uber. As evidence of its mass appeal, Uber has completed over 1 
billion rides since its inception.156 
Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship relied on a combination of innovative
and traditional techniques as laws changed in the United States.  These 
efforts have been largely successful despite regulators resisting the change
at every level.  At the end of the day, Uber is operating in almost every major
United States city, a feat that can only support the idea that the company 
has succeeded. 
IV. UBER’S REGULATORY ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN FRANCE
Ironically, though Kalanick and Camp came up with the idea for Uber 
in Paris,157  which is where Uber met some of its toughest challenges from
regulators. Uber expanded into Europe by starting Uber France,158 which 
was Uber’s first test of the European market.  Uber France ended up proving 
to be very different than Uber’s introduction into the United States, as the 
French government was more successful regulating Uber and forcing the 
company to concede on issues.  As Uber France’s CEO, Thibaud Simphal,
bluntly put it, “[France] has sadly been the most resistant to Uber.  We were
wrong to think that it could work here like it did in the United States where 
markets are a little more open to change.”159 
Uber France offers similar services to its counterpart in the United 
States. Uber operates its UberPOP service in France, which is comparable
in price and car size to UberX in the United States.160  Uber also has UberX
155. This fine was for misleading customers about safety.  Uber claimed that it had 
the “safest rides on the road” and that its background checks were the most thorough in
the industry, both of which were misleading.  Elizabeth Weise, Uber to Pay up to $25 
Million Fine, USA TODAY (Apr. 7, 2016, 7:07 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/ 
news/2016/04/07/uber-pay-up-25-million-fine/82769030 [https://perma.cc/XL3V-CYXH]. 
156. Kia Kokalitcheva, Uber Completes 1 Billion Rides, FORTUNE (Dec. 30, 2015), 
http://fortune.com/2015/12/30/uber-completes-1-billion-rides [https://perma.cc/EK5J-FJVB]. 
157.  Travis Kalanick, Uber’s Founding, UBER: NEWSROOM (Dec. 22, 2010), https://
newsroom.uber.com/ubers-founding [https://perma.cc/X6S8-U4QW]. 
158. Alderman, supra note 36. 
159. Sam Schechner, Uber Plans Big Advertising Campaign in France, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 9, 2016, 7:11 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-plans-big-advertising-campaign­
in-france-1457462344. 
160. Alderman, supra note 36. 
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in France, but UberX functions more like UberBLACK in the United States
because it requires that drivers have a limousine license and a black vehicle
to drive.161  The important distinctions are the licensing requirements for 
the services.  The limousine licenses are easier to get than a taxi license
because the number of taxi licenses is fixed, whereas the number of limousine 
licenses is not.162  UberPOP allows drivers without any operational license
to work for Uber, as long as the driver has a car, a driver’s license, and 
insurance.163  Because the service allows drivers to essentially operate a
taxi service without a taxi license, UberPOP is the center of Uber’s battle 
with regulators in France.164 
This section will first discuss Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship strategies 
in France. Then, it will analyze French regulators’ responses.  Finally, it will
discuss the factors that allowed the government in France to have more 
success regulating Uber than regulators in the United States.
A. Uber’s Approach in France 
Uber used many of the same tactics in France that it used in the United 
States, and for good reason. Its regulatory entrepreneurship was largely
successful in the United States because of those tactics.165  However, Uber
had to adjust its strategies as regulators responded to the company’s business
operations.
In order to foster growth, Uber operated at a loss to provide bonuses to 
its French drivers.166  The bonuses depended on the number of rides a driver
completed and their average rating for these rides.167  A driver that completed 
75 rides in a week made €800 in bonuses.168  Based on Uber’s rates and 
161. Id.
 162. Romain Dillet, Uber, Chauffeur-Privé and Others Can’t Recruit New Drivers 
in France for the Next Two Months, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 14, 2014), https://techcrunch.com/
2014/02/14/uber-chauffeur-prive-and-others-cant-recruit-new-drivers-in-france-for-the­
next-two-months [https://perma.cc/Y7MU-8TJT].
163. Alderman, supra note 36. 
164. See Amar Toor, Uber Fined 800,000 Euros Over Low-Cost Service in France, 
THE VERGE (June 9, 2016, 9:26 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2016/6/9/11893484/uber­
fined-france-paris-uberpop-service [https://perma.cc/8R62-9SU2].
165. See discussion supra Part III. 
166. Romain Dillet, Uber Wants to Take Over the French Market with Aggressive 
Bonus Tactics, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 28, 2014), https://techcrunch.com/2014/02/28/uber­
wants-to-take-over-the-french-market-by-using-dumping-tactics [https://perma.cc/A6UE-AKNU].
167. Id. 
168.  Approximately $1,100 USD.  Id. 
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the percentage it keeps from the fare, Uber lost $1,100 USD in revenue
per driver per week, three times what it took in.169 
Uber’s recruitment focused on getting limousine-licensed drivers into 
its ranks, as opposed to recruiting drivers with taxi licenses.170 There were
two reasons for this: (1) limousine licenses allowed Uber to operate legally
with its UberX service, and (2) recruiting from this pool allowed Uber to 
pull drivers from French ridesharing competitors such as LeCab and 
Chauffeur-Privé.171  When France issued a two-month ban on recruiting new
drivers, Uber instituted its bonuses to draw drivers away from competitors in
an effort to deplete the available pool of drivers.172 
Uber also launched billboard campaigns across France, showing individuals 
from diverse professions and ethnicities enjoying themselves in the back
of an Uber.173  The campaign was an attempt to get French citizens’ focus
away from the negative news about Uber and back on its product.174 This
campaign was important to Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship as mass
appeal affects whether it can achieve guerilla growth and mobilize enough 
political support from its users.
B. The French Government’s Response 
Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship contradicted the tough regulations
that the French government imposed on commercial activity.  “France, 
home of the 35-hour work week and one of the most protective regulatory 
regimes in Europe, sees it differently. UberPOP, with its nonchalance about 
regulation and its gig-economy boosterism, is radically un-French.”175 
This contrast fueled many of the battles between Uber and France. 
Fines were the most common method of cracking down on Uber drivers. 
Paris created a special law enforcement department, called the Boers, to
stop Uber drivers and issue tickets.176  Once Uber drivers were ticketed, 
they were told to stop driving for the company.177  However, Uber paid 
for these tickets, and the drivers kept driving.178 
169.  For a more detailed explanation of the mathematics, see id. 
170. See id.
171. LeCab and Chauffeur-Privé run similar rideshare services to Uber, yet they also
protest Uber’s methods for being allegedly anti-competition. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Lucinda Shen, This is Uber’s Plan to Fix it’s Image in France, FORTUNE (Mar.
10, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/03/10/uber-france-ad-campaign-fix [https://perma.cc/ 
6F5B-D2VK].
174. Id. 
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Regulations focused on punishing both the drivers and the company 
itself.179  The French government tried regulations that hit specific areas
of Uber’s business model, such as driver recruitment and passenger pickup.
The government halted issuing new limousine licenses for two months to 
slow Uber’s growth.180  It also instituted a 15-minute wait law that required 
drivers to wait 15-minutes from the time a ride was requested before they 
could pick up a passenger.181  The 15-minute wait law sought to drive users
away from Uber by lengthening their ride time.182  Additionally, taxi unions
called on the government to ban Uber’s smartphone app; however, it still 
remains operational.183 
In 2014, France passed comprehensive national legislation that regulated 
Uber. Called the Thévenoud law, the law banned UberPOP and required
Uber drivers to conform to many of the same regulations as taxi drivers.184 
Drivers could be fined up to $17,000 and serve a year in prison for picking
up passengers in an UberPOP.185  Despite these penalties, Uber was undeterred.
Thibaud Simphal, stated, “If a judge tomorrow says UberPop should stop,
we would stop. But we don’t see there’s a reason to stop now.”186 
Uber challenged the Thévenoud law in multiple courts and on different 
grounds.  France’s highest constitutional court, the Conseil Constitutionnel, 
held the Thévenoud law constitutional, despite Uber’s challenges.187
 179. See Uber Management Arrested in Government Crackdown, THE ECONOMIST
(July 6, 2015), http://www.eiu.com/industry/article/153319599/uber-management-arrested-in­
government-crackdown/2015-07-06 [https://perma.cc/37M2-8WP5].
180. Dillet, supra note 162. 
181. Romain Dillet, Council of State Suspends 15-Minute Law Against Uber, LeCab




 183. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 179. 
184. CODE DES TRANSPORTS [C.TRAN.][TRANSPORTATION CODE] art. L3121-24 (Fr.) (found
at https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000029527162& 
dateTexte=&categorieLien=id) [https://perma.cc/LLS7-CGQE].
185. Laure Forurquet & Mark Scott, Uber Drivers Face Fines in Paris, N.Y. TIMES:
BITS (Feb. 22, 2015, 11:30 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/02/22/uber-drivers­
face-fines-in-paris [https://perma.cc/CN59-WVSC].
186. Id. 
187. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2015-468/ 
469/472 QPC, May 22, 2015 (Fr.); Nicolas Boring, France: Constitutional Court Rules 
on Car-Hiring Services Legislation, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR
(June 30, 2015), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/france-constitutional-court­
rules-on-car-hiring-services-legislation [https://perma.cc/MP4V-5LUX].
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However, Uber succeeded in another court, the Conseil d’Etat, France’s 
highest court for administrative law, which struck down part of the law 
that banned Uber’s app from showing car locations.188  The court deemed
providing the locations an “information society service,” and European
Union law requires notifying the European Union before a country can 
regulate those services.189 Since France had not notified the European Union, 
the law violated EU law.190 During the time that these cases were pending, 
Uber continued to operate UberPOP, showing just how bold the company’s 
disregard for the law could be.191 
Uber’s relaxed compliance with French law ended abruptly in 2015.
The French government raided Uber’s Paris headquarters, held its employees
for six hours and seized documents, emails, and cellphones.192  Uber protested
the raid as “a disproportionate action,”193 a choice of words that revealed
just how startlingly aggressive the government raid was.  In contrast, Uber’s
United States offices were never searched by police, and the French
government’s willingness to take such action highlights the differences
between the countries’ regulatory actions. 
A few months after the police raid, Paris police arrested Thibaud Simphal 
and Pierre-Dimitri Gore-Coty, Uber Europe’s General Manager, charging 
them with running an illegal taxi company and concealing digital documents.194 
Violent taxi protests over Uber’s disregard for the ban on UberPOP and 
an expansion of the service into smaller French towns pressured the French
government into making the arrests.195  The executives faced up to five
years’ imprisonment and personal fines of €300,000.196  Uber itself faced 
a fine of €1.5 million.197 The possible prison sentence underlined how serious 
the French government considered these violations.  Uber and its executives 
188. Sam Schechner, Uber Wins a Round for Its App in France, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9,
2016, 1:03 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-wins-a-round-for-its-app-in-france­
1457546610. 
5:52 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2015/3/18/8240685/uber-france-office-raided-police- 
189. Id. 
190. See id.
 191. See id.
 192. See Amar Toor, Police Raid Uber Offices in Paris, THE VERGE (Mar. 18, 2015, 
uberpop [https://perma.cc/YE4M-PVS2].
193. Chris O’Brien, Paris Police Raid Uber Offices as French Drivers Face Fines,
VENTUREBEAT (Mar. 18, 2015, 5:21 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2015/03/18/paris-police­
raid-uber-offices-as-french-drivers-face-fines [https://perma.cc/8FCU-5A9T].
194. Dillet, supra note 38. 
195. See id.
 196. Top Uber Executives on Trial in France Over ‘Illegal Taxi’ Charges, GUARDIAN
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were convicted, but did not receive prison time.198 Instead, the court ordered 
Uber to pay €800,000, Simphal to pay €20,000, and Gore-Coty to pay 
€30,000.199 
Uber suspended its UberPOP service shortly after its executives were 
arrested.200  Uber never resumed UberPOP in France, and now only operates
its UberX and UberBLACK services in accordance with the limousine
and taxi licenses that the government requires.  While Uber still has those 
regulated services, giving up UberPOP, the service that was by nature 
anti-regulation, was a defeat for Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship. 
C. Factors That Influenced Regulators’ Success in France 
French regulators had more success regulating Uber and maintaining 
the status quo in the taxi industry than regulators in the United States. 
Two discernible factors allowed France to succeed where United States
regulators could not. First, France’s government structure as a civil law 
based European Union member with a Socialist regime places a higher 
focus on regulation than the United States does.  Second, France’s culture 
tends to tolerate riots and protests, and anti-Uber protests influenced regulators’ 
responses and public opinion about the company, making it harder to gain 
a political advantage. 
1. France’s Government 
The French government has several advantages that influenced regulators’ 
ability to control Uber. Regulations on Uber came from the French national 
government, which has the resources and power necessary to issue laws 
controlling Uber. France’s socialist structure encouraged regulation to 
come from the national government.  Its place within the highly regulated 
European Union also encouraged regulation from the highest levels of 
government. 
France is a civil law country with a socialist government, so national 
regulation is common in all aspects of French life. Paris struggled to contain 
198. See Kali Hays, Uber, French Execs Fined $950k Over UberPop Service, LAW
360 (June 9, 2016, 3:59 PM) https://www.law360.com/technology/articles/805343/uber­
french-execs-fined-905k-over-uberpop-service [https://perma.cc/85QC-4UQU].
199. Id. 
200. See Chris O’Brien, Uber Suspends UberPOP in France, Citing Safety and Legal 
Concerns, VENTUREBEAT (July 3, 2015, 3:18 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2015/07/03/uber­
suspends-uberpop-in-france-citing-safety-and-legal-concerns [https://perma.cc/UB9B-63P9]. 
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Uber, and the Paris prosecutor’s office requested that the national government 
step in: prompting the government to raid Uber and arrest its executives.201 
As Barry and Pollman point out, Uber has the most success when it is
battling smaller municipal or state governments because its resources and
agility match up favorably against the slower bureaucratic process.202 This 
regulation from the top down allowed the French government to match Uber’s
resources and limit its ability to sidestep the law.  Uber had an easier time 
battling cities in the United States, where political pressure was easier to 
create and Uber’s business resources went further against a governing body 
with less resources.
France is also a member of the European Union, which means that regulations 
at the national level may be subject to scrutiny at the transnational level. 
French regulations must be consistent with EU law, as the Conseil d’Etat’s 
decision held.203  Uber is currently litigating its business model in the
European Court of Justice,204  and if Uber is deemed a cab service by the
European Court of Justice then it will fall under stricter regulations.205 
However, if it is merely a digital service that connects riders and drivers,
then it can operate with less restrictions and easily expand across Europe.206 
The case is especially important because Uber has faced similar resistance 
in almost every country in Europe.207  Uber’s entire European market may 
well depend on this case being decided in its favor. 
The European Union has spent a few years adapting to the sharing 
economy or as it is called in Europe, the collaborative economy.208  In a
staff working document, the European Commission seemed receptive to 
solutions that will best benefit both consumers and Uber.209  The report
201. Hannah Jane Parkinson, Uber Offices Raided in Paris by French Police in ‘Car-
Pooling’ Controversy, The GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2015/mar/18/uber-offices-raided-in-paris [https://perma.cc/TT3C-TJXA].
202.  Barry & Pollman, supra note 3, at 418–19. 
203. Schechner, supra note 159. 
204. Duncan Robinson & Madhumita Murgia, European court takes up the 
question: what is Uber?, FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/ 
f2774c9a-b566-11e6-ba85-95d1533d9a62. 
205. Id. 
206. Leonid Bershidsky, EU Court Will Resolve Uber’s Identity Crisis, BLOOMBERG 
VIEW (Nov. 30, 2017, 4:29AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-11-30/
taxi-or-tech-eu-court-will-rule-on-uber-s-identity [https://perma.cc/66WM-RU2C].
207. For a detailed discussion of each country and the resistance Uber is facing, see
Demasi, supra note 43, at 76–83. 
208. EUR. COMM’N, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE 
COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS - A EUROPEAN AGENDA FOR THE COLLABORATIVE ECONOMY, 
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stated that, “there is significant economic potential in the collaborative
economy but also a large degree of uncertainty regarding rights and
obligations.”210  Furthermore, the report also stated that regulations that 
are too rigid can cause problems for European economies.211  The report
discusses ridesharing with facts favorable to Uber.212 It notes that regulations
and, in particular, licensing requirements for drivers stifle the business 
growth of ridesharing platforms.213  The report seeks a solution that fosters
economic growth driven by Uber and other ridesharing companies but 
tempers it with moderate regulation that ensures the worrisome areas of
Uber’s competitive business model are kept in check.214  In essence, the
European Commission wants to protect all parties involved, which is a
good sign for Uber in Europe considering the alternative. 
Uber battled regulators at the municipal level, as it did in the United
States, but it also contended with the French national government as well. 
This alone was enough to tilt the scale in favor of regulators. But the 
European Union has a say in the regulatory scheme as well, meaning Uber 
had an even tougher time escaping regulation.  This regulatory ladder had
more political power and resources to keep Uber from escaping their 
regulations. Uber faced no such national resistance in the United States.
As a result, France was more successful in regulating Uber than jurisdictions
in the United States because of its from-the-top regulatory scheme.
2. Cultural Challenges 
Foreign culture poses interesting challenges for any company looking 
to expand overseas.  France in particular is known for strikes, riots, and 
protests on a number of different issues. The taxi protests in France 
exerted pressure on regulators and forced the government into action. Full 
blown riots and violence over a company’s business model are almost 
unheard of in the United States, and riots of that caliber are generally over 
social issues such as race. 
Parisian taxi drivers mobilized to fight Uber’s threat of deregulation. 
“Today, the city has just 17,702 taxis, only a few thousand more than it 







Id. at 4. 
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tries to expand the fleet, irate taxi drivers protest with a form of strike they
call operation Escargot, in which cabbies inch along thoroughfares, snarling 
traffic all over the capital.215  The taxi drivers blockaded highways and
setup checkpoints, even going so far as to smash Uber drivers’ windows 
and slash their tires.216 
These protests work, and are a sort of antithesis to regulatory
entrepreneurship’s strategy of mobilizing users.  The Uber executives’ arrests 
came directly after violent protests,217 and tension between taxi companies
and Uber led to laws like the 15-minute law218 and the Thevenoud law.219 
The French taxi industry was essentially beating Uber at its own game in 
the most violent and disruptive way possible.  Witness reports from the
riots made Paris sound like a war zone,220  and taxi drivers even protested
the regulations that they asked for because they were not enough.221 
Essentially, taxi drivers made Uber more than just a business or economic
issue.  They made the company a safety issue.  But it is important to note
that these safety issues were not directly because of Uber.  Uber’s drivers
were not excessively dangerous on the road or committing criminal acts 
against their passengers.  The danger came from taxi drivers who believed
that Uber was threatening their jobs, violently protested against Uber, and 
wrought havoc on the streets of France.222 Regardless of the fact that Uber 
was not the direct problem, these protests succeeded by inserting safety
into in the conversation about regulating Uber.  The French government
had to take action to keep its citizens safe and maintain order.  The obvious
choice was regulating Uber, the foreign disruptor, rather than changing 
the status quo for an entrenched industry that was engrained in French
culture. 
Protests are common in any democratic society.  However, the violence
in the French taxi protests is surprising given the subject matter.  The taxi 
drivers attacked Uber drivers for working for a company.223  In the United 
States, citizens tend to violently protest civil rights violations and social
justice issues.  When a corporation is involved, the protests are generally
 215. Alderman, supra note 36. 
216. Id. 
217. France Arrests Uber, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2015, 8:49 AM), http://www.wsj.
com/articles/france-arrests-uber-1435927738. 
218. Dillet, supra note 181. 
219. O’Brien, supra note 200. 
220. Toor, supra note 164. 
221. Taxi drivers wanted a 30-minute rule instead of a 15-minute rule. Dillet, supra
note 181. 
222. French Taxi Drivers Smash Cars in Strike Against Uber, CBS NEWS (June 25,
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aimed at the corporation itself, not low-level employees.224  The idea that 
a protest would attack the people working for a company because of a
company’s business model is quite foreign to the United States.  This is
not to say France is a more violent country than the United States, but that 
the protest culture in France allowed protests over Uber to escalate to the
point that they became a safety issue ultimately requiring action on the 
part of the government. As a result, regulation was swift when public 
safety became an issue.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION
There are valid public policy reasons in favor of France regulating and
de-regulating Uber. These policy interests go to the heart of consumer
protection laws, anti-competition laws, and anti-trust laws.  This section
will analyze these competing interests before it proposes a solution to 
Uber’s regulatory entrepreneurship in France.
Regulation is meant to protect consumers and competition, and huge 
technology companies like Uber wield considerable power that makes 
consumer advocacy and antitrust groups nervous.225  Even in the United 
States, there are still valid concerns about how Uber treats its competitors, 
drivers,226 and customers.227 
Uber has used, and has been accused of using, unethical and borderline 
illegal tactics against its competitors.  Uber allegedly launched a massive
distributed denial of service (“DDoS”) attack on Gett cars, one of Uber’s
 224. See, e.g., Rupert Neate, SeaWorld to End Killer Whale Shows in Wake of Mounting
Protests, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2016, 4:19 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us­
news/2015/nov/09/seaworld-end-orca-whale-shows-san-diego [https://perma.cc/DF7U-DYLB]. 
225. Taming the Beasts, THE ECONOMIST (May 28, 2016), http://www.economist. 
com/news/business/21699465-european-governments-are-not-alone-wondering-how-deal- 
digital-giants-taming [https://perma.cc/KP5Z-KS8K].
226.  Uber refuses to call its drivers employees, which affects drivers’ benefits.  The 
debate is still raging, as Uber only recently granted drivers unemployment benefits after
formerly working for Uber.  Noam Scheiber, Uber Drivers Ruled Eligible for Jobless Payments
in New York State, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/13/ 
business/state-rules-2-former-uber-drivers-eligible-for-jobless-payments.html?_r=2.
227. For instance, there is evidence that Uber drivers racially and sexually discriminated
against minority customers. See, e.g., Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber and Lyft Can be Just as 







































rideshare rivals, in New York City.228  Uber drivers allegedly ordered and 
cancelled more than 100 rides from Gett, slowing down the service and 
preventing legitimate customers from accessing rides.229  There is even
evidence that Uber’s managers participated in these attacks.230 
Uber’s surge pricing feature, which increases fares to get more drivers 
on the road, has repeatedly been criticized as price fixing.231  For example,
on a holiday weekend in San Diego, Uber stopped new drivers from 
driving so fares would increase for riders.232  Uber denied this, instead 
stating that it stopped new drivers from signing up the week before.233 
The company maintained that it is merely a third party and that the market
sets the price.234  However, the fact that Uber can control its supply of
drivers says otherwise.
These concerns helped spark the protests throughout France and gave 
French regulators the political support they needed to pass laws that
controlled Uber’s business.235  Although Uber did not cross the ethical line
as much in France as it did in the United States, its reputation preceded it.
This led French taxi drivers and government regulators to worry about 
how far Uber would push its aggressive policies. 
On the other hand, economic policy and the free market favor deregulation,
particularly in France.  French foreign investment is down, and its economy 
is struggling to create jobs for the younger generation.  Competition is
healthy for economic growth, and Uber’s competition with taxis will help 
the economy grow.  Also, Uber offers a partial solution that the currently 
regulated taxi system cannot solve.
There are numerous problematic reasons for allowing the current taxi 
system to remain.  The French public is frustrated by the lack of innovation 
from the government when it comes to transportation.236  In Paris, where
 228. Rip Emerson, Black Car Competitor Accuses Uber of DDoS-Style Attack; Uber
Admits Tactics Are “Too Aggressive”, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 24, 2014), https://techcrunch.com/
2014/01/24/black-car-competitor-accuses-uber-of-shady-conduct-ddos-style-attack-uber­
expresses-regret [https://perma.cc/D6EM-7H2S]. 
‘Surge Pricing’, L.A. WEEKLY (Dec. 17, 2013, 2:22 PM), http://www.laweekly.com/news/ubers- 
229. Id. 
230. Id. 
231. See Dennis Romero, Uber’s $357 Crosstown L.A. Ride Highlights Controversial
357-crosstown-la-ride-highlights-controversial-surge-pricing-4255297 [https://perma.cc/
U756-ZREW]; Ben Popper, Uber Kept New Drivers Off the Road to Encourage Surge Pricing 
and Increase Fares, THE VERGE (Feb. 26, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.theverge.com/
2014/2/26/5445210/in-san-diego-uber-kept-drivers-off-the-road-to-encourage-surge [https:// 
perma.cc/2F2A-FMK4].
232. Popper, supra note 231. 
233. Id. 
234. Id. 
235. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
236. See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 179. 
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the government directly controls taxi licenses, the number of taxis has not
changed despite an increase in demand.237  This demand increase has led 
to scarce rides and high prices.238  Uber’s platform relies on the free market, 
and can help to alleviate this problem by placing more cabs on the road at 
competitive prices.
Uber has a different role in France’s economy than it does in the United 
States. While Uber does not have as many drivers in Paris as it has in
New York City or San Francisco, 81% of the drivers in Paris do not have 
another form of employment.239  This is in contrast to the United States, 
where Uber is mostly supplemental income, and shows just how important
Uber is to its drivers in France.240  Furthermore, Uber does not have non-
compete clauses for their drivers.241  As Uber told TechCrunch, “We don’t 
force our drivers to work exclusively for us.  They always have the choice.”242 
Thus, drivers may drive for other rideshare companies in Europe and support 
the economy in that way as well. 
France’s broader economics also favor deregulation.  France has an
overall unemployment rate of 9.9%, but 25.1% of males age 15-24 are 
unemployed, and 22.5% of females aged 15-24 are unemployed.243  20%
of Uber drivers work more than 40 hours a week, and most drivers earn €20 
an hour, which is more than double the minimum wage.244  Particularly in
the poorer Parisian suburbs called banlieues, Uber is a beacon of possibility 
for lower class workers looking to lift themselves into better economic 
situations.245  A French bipartisan commission found that opening the taxi
market to competition from rideshare platforms can create 35,000-45,000 
driving jobs in Paris, and even more in the rest of the country.246  Paris
 237. Id. 
238. Id.
 239. Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, Uber: A Route out of the French Banlieues, FINANCIAL
TIMES (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/bf3d0444-e129-11e5-9217-6ae3733a2cd1. 
240. Id. 
241. Dillet, supra note 162. 
242. Id. 
243. Unemployment, youth female (% of female labor force ages 15-24), THEWORLDBANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.FE.ZS?end=2014&start=1991&view=map 
(last visited Sept. 5, 2017) [https://perma.cc/7G3W-WF5L].


























       
  
        
 
   
  
  
makes up 18% of the entire French population,247 so these numbers are
important for French economic growth.248 
French regulators should allow Uber to continue to operate UberPOP,
or an alternative service that lets drivers without a taxi or limousine license 
operate under Uber.  France’s economics favor allowing these services to
continue. UberPOP can create economic opportunities for young French
workers, and can help to heal the economy.  As the European Commission
keeps looking for efficient solutions, a compromise of this sort seems possible, 
at least at the transnational level. Whether France gives Uber regulatory
leeway will remain to be seen. 
France’s outright ban on UberPOP places the company in the exact
same position as the taxi industry.  There is little growth opportunity when
the government sets the number of licenses available to drivers.  If the 
French government shows flexibility by allowing innovative companies 
to enter the country and create jobs, then more regulatory entrepreneurs 
may attempt to do business in France. As the situation currently stands,
Uber’s struggles in France send warning signs to other innovators looking 
to expand into France, turning away jobs for French citizens. 
France is justifiably focused on its consumers given the concerns about 
Uber’s alleged anti-competition practices.  Yet, a ban on UberPOP does
not protect consumers; it harms them.  The taxi industry in France has an 
incredible amount of power, none of which is in the hands of the consumer. 
Taxi strikes occur often, inconveniencing the average rider.  The strict 
government regulations on licenses essentially give the industry a monopoly 
on prices and services, which are used to the driver’s advantage rather
than for the rider’s convenience.  Allowing Uber to operate its UberPOP
service may improve the traditional taxi industry by forcing it to reassess 
its customer service to compete with Uber. 
Rather than cracking down on Uber, France’s government should penalize 
taxi drivers for rioting and conducting other dangerous acts against Uber 
drivers. The government’s safety concerns stem from the taxi industry’s 
riots and attacks on Uber drivers, not from Uber’s cab service.  Uber’s service 
is not making France less safe, but rather the French taxi industry’s response
to Uber is.  The fact that the French government arrested Uber France’s
executives and placed them on trial, but did not take any action to deter
taxi industry riots, is concerning. France should focus on the actual source
of danger and crack down on taxi drivers looking to injure citizens. 
247. France Population, WORLD POPULATION REVIEW,http://worldpopulationreview.com/
countries/france-population (last visited Sept. 5, 2017) [https://perma.cc/TL3S-NYFF]. 
248. French Unemployment Rate Falls Below 10% for the First Time Since 2012,
THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/18/french­
unemployment-rate-falls-first-time-2012-francois-hollande [https://perma.cc/EQ9T-KGWF]. 
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Once the government quells the taxi protests, the French government 
and the French public may change their perspective on Uber. As a result 
of this shift in focus, France may view Uber as a vehicle for economic
growth rather than associating the company with street violence.  Damage
to Uber’s public image may already be done, and unless Uber is separated
from the taxi protests in the minds of the French government and its
citizens, deregulation remains a distant goal and France will continue to 
ban UberPOP. 
This solution is a compromise between the two sides that seeks to satisfy 
the policy goals of protecting consumers, ensuring healthy competition, 
and fostering economic growth.  Uber brings benefits to France which
outweigh the concerns raised by its regulatory entrepreneurship.  France
can allow Uber to operate while ensuring the company does not harm its
consumers or the competing taxi industry.
VI. CONCLUSION: WHY UBER’S REGULATORY ENTREPRENEURSHIP
 IN FRANCE MATTERS
Regulatory entrepreneurs are expanding across the world.  Uber has drivers 
in over 50 countries,249  Lyft has expanded into east Asia,250 and Airbnb is in
more than 191 countries.251  As more regulatory entrepreneurships startup and 
succeed, regulatory entrepreneurship will become common throughout
the world.  As these disrupters expand, they will inevitably meet resistance
from new jurisdictions they enter, just as they did when they began in the 
United States. 
It is important for regulators to know how these companies will act and 
how regulatory entrepreneurs change the law.  Ten years ago, the concept 
of getting into a stranger’s personal car for a ride seemed, well, strange. 
Now however, it is commonplace to call an Uber or a Lyft.  To try to guess 
where regulatory entrepreneurship will go in the next ten years is impossible,
but regulators can learn from current companies and at least predict general 
strategies for regulatory entrepreneurship. 
249. Locations, UBER NEWSROOM, https://newsroom.uber.com/locations (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2017) [https://perma.cc/4N55-YXSK]. 
250. Cities, LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/cities (last visited Sept. 5, 2017) [https://perma.
cc/69X5-JTFG].
251. About us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us (last visited Sept. 5,
2017) [https://perma.cc/Q2SF-GRRF].
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On the other side, it is important for regulatory entrepreneurs to determine 
factors that allowed other companies to succeed or caused them to fail
while planning an expansion into a foreign country.  In their quest for
growth, regulatory entrepreneurs will keep expanding into these markets,
and each time will meet a set of challenges similar to Uber’s expansion 
into France. Regulatory entrepreneurs will become more adequately prepared
for these expansions by recognizing which countries’ political and cultural
systems are the most receptive to the changes that they bring, and by
understanding the factors that could hinder their entrepreneurship. 
As technology pushes regulatory entrepreneurship forward, studies on
regulatory entrepreneurs will become necessary to analyze the impact
these companies have on society, the economy, and the law.  Professors Barry
and Pollman’s Regulatory Entrepreneurship lays a framework for analyzing
these companies and the regulators that oppose them.  The scholarly works
that will grow around their theory will help regulators and entrepreneurs 
to efficiently come to solutions.  This Comment seeks to contribute to that 
literature in an international context. 
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